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CAN CONGRESS REQUIRE THAT STATES WAIVE
THEIR IMMUNITY TO PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN
EXCHANGE FOR RECEIVING FEDERAL PATENT
RIGHTS?
Roger C. Rich*
All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on
compromise and barter.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

James Madison stated that the utility of granting Congress the power to create a national patent system would
"scarcely be questioned."' The patent system is designed to
encourage both the creation and public disclosure of new inventions.3 In exchange for their disclosures, inventors are
compensated with a limited right to exclude others from using
* Senior Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. J.D.
candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; Ph.D., University of California, Irvine; B.S., San Jose State University.
1. Edmund Burke, Speech on Moving his Resolutions for Conciliation with
the Colonies (March 22, 1775), in EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH ON CONCILIATION
WITH AMERICA 112 (William MacDonald ed., American Book Co. 1904).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed., 1961).
For the Constitutional basis for Congress to provide for both copyrights and
patents, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Commenting on the inclusion of this
clause into the Constitution, James Madison stated:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases
with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of the point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra,at 309.
3. See Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th
Cir. 1972).
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their inventions.4 This particular right to exclude constitutes
a recognizable property interest.' Indeed, patent ownership
can be an extremely valuable commercial asset in the marketplace.
While both private and state entities may be granted a
patent, only state entities are protected by sovereign immunity. Despite the fact that federal courts have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions arising under federal
patent law,6 sovereign immunity prevents a private sector
scientist from maintaining a patent infringement suit against
a competitor working for a state entity.7 Nonetheless, the
private sector scientist remains liable to the state-based competitor for any infringement that the private sector scientist
commits. Conceivably, this imbalance could undermine the
utility of a national patent scheme.
This comment analyzes whether, through the use of conditional waivers, Congress could effectively level the playing
field between the private and state entities participating in
the marketplace, while remaining consistent with constitutional principles that recognize the inherent differences between a sovereign state and a private citizen.
Part II of this comment gives an overview of the doctrine
of state sovereignty and the circumstances under which an
individual may sue a state.8 Two such circumstances arise
where Congress authorizes a suit in the exercise of its Section
5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment ("abroga4. See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533 (1870).
5. See id.; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642 (1999); see also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994) (declaring that
"patents shall have the attributes of personal property").
6. Federal law confers original and exclusive jurisdiction to federal district
courts to hear all cases arising under copyright and patent laws. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) (2001). Federal courts have had exclusive jurisdiction over patent litigation for nearly 200 years. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Campbell v. Havervill, 155 U.S. 610, 620 (1985)).
7. Cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("[A] suit directly against a State by one of its own citizens is not one to which
the judicial power of the United States extends, unless the State itself consents
to be sued."); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 745 (1999) ("[Tlhe States retain their immunity
from private suits prosecuted in their own courts."). There are some possible
exceptions to the general proposition that an individual cannot maintain a suit
against a state entity. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
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tion"),9 or where a state waives its sovereign immunity by
consenting to suit ("waiver")."
Congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the area of federal intellectual property have failed.
In companion cases, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank" and College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,2 the United States Supreme Court held that
private lawsuits alleging state patent infringement and unfair competition, respectively, could not be sustained despite
unambiguous federal statutes that subjected states to liability.'3 Consequently, several authors proposed "solutions" to
aid private individuals in protecting their patent rights in the
4 These soluface of patent infringement by state entities.
tions present the forms of relief available as an alternative to
conditional waivers.
Conditional waiver theory relies on the notion that since
states may voluntarily waive sovereign immunity to private
lawsuits, Congress should be able to request such a waiver in
return for benefits that the Federal Government is not otherwise obliged to provide to the states. 5 Even though the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the validity of conditional waivers of sovereign immunity, there are suggestions
in dicta that the Court would find the theory of conditional
waivers constitutionally sound. 6 The criteria that must be
met in order to make a conditional waiver scheme permissible
9. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
10. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 670; Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436
(1883).
11. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
12. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See discussion infra Part II.C.
15. See discussion infra Part II.D.
16. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (citing South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), as support for the proposition that the Federal
Government does not "lack the authority or means to seek the States' voluntary
consent to private suit"); Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996) (noting the care
Congress took to craft an "unambiguous waiver of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity" in section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994)); Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686-87 (describing
congressionally placed conditions upon receiving federal gratuities as being
fundamentally different than conditions placed upon states' ability to engage in
otherwise permissible activity).
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in practice, particularly in reference to patent law, is still an
open question.
In South Dakota v. Dole, 7 the Supreme Court delineated
criteria (the "Dole test") to analyze whether Congress's exercise of the spending power is permissible where a state is required to raise the minimum drinking age as a condition for
receiving certain federal monies. 1 Although the Dole test is,
the best approximation of the factors that the Supreme Court
considers relevant in analyzing conditional waivers, 9 lower
courts have found conditional waivers of sovereign immunity
valid without considering the test. ° This apparent discrepancy is examined in Part IV. Part IV also identifies the particular concerns courts have deemed important when confronted with conditional waivers of state sovereign immunity.
Part V presents the concerns that must be taken into account
for conditional waivers to work in patent law.2' Part V concludes with an outline of how congressional legislation might
be formulated to effect a permissible conditional waiver in
patent law.22
II. BACKGROUND
A.

State Sovereign Immunity to PrivateLawsuit
Jurisprudence relating to sovereign immunity has not
been consistent.2 3 Various theoretical explanations for state
sovereign immunity exist, deriving from the common-law doctrine of state sovereignty,24 interpretations of the Eleventh
17. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
18. See id. at 207-08.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
20. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying discussion.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7 (noting that the Supreme Court's "state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence is frequently convoluted, contradictory, and
obscure").
24. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:CongressionalImposition of Suit upon the States, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1261-62 (1978); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515,
540-45 (1978); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create
Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
FourteenthAmendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1441-45 (1975); Laurence H.
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Amendment,25 and from a desire to preserve the integrity of
the American political processes and state self-determination
of its own monies.26 The practical reality is that private citizens are generally precluded from maintaining a suit against
27
a state entity in both federal and state courts. A state's sovereign immunity "is not absolute," since the Supreme Court
recognizes "two circumstances in which an individual may
sue a State."28 These circumstances exist when Congress abrogates state immunity or when a state voluntarily consents

Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation:
Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 682, 693-96 (1976). In his dissent in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Justice
Souter explains common-law doctrine:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity comprises two distinct rules, which
are not always separately recognized. The one rule holds that the King
or the Crown, as the font of law, is not bound by the law's provisions;
the other provides that the King or Crown, as the font of justice, is not
subject to suit in its own courts.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102-05 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Whether the common-law doctrine has any bearing on the states' sovereign immunity to private lawsuit in the United States has been vigorously disputed by
others. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, In Defense of our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42
B.C.L. REV. 485 (2001).

25. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or

by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. A mi-

nority of justices interpret the Eleventh Amendment as being a restriction of
the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 114-15
(Souter, J., dissenting). The majority's viewpoint in Seminole Tribe, as stated
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, is as follows:
Although text of the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict
only the Art. III diversity of the federal courts, we have understood [it]
to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ...
that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system... [and that
it] is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent.
Id. at 54 (1996) (citations omitted).
26. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749-51 (1999).
27. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring)
([A] suit directly against a State by one of its own citizens is not one to which
the judicial power of the United States extends, unless the State itself consents
to be sued."); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934);
Alden, 527 U.S. at 745 ("[T]he States retain their immunity from private suits
prosecuted in their own courts.").
28. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
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to suit, 9 as discussed in the following sections.
B. Abrogation
States may not disregard protections of Constitutional
rights as recognized under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 ° When an individual's rights of "life, liberty,
and property" are at stake, then Congress has a remedial
power to abrogate state immunity." This power is granted to
the Federal Government under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment ("Section 5").32

In the 1990's Congress expressly abrogated state sovereign immunity in two different acts: the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act ("TRCA") and the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act ("PRCA").3 As examined
29. See id.
30. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55 ("The constitutional privilege of a State to
assert its sovereign immunity... does not confer upon the State a concomitant
right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law."); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976) (rationalizing that the diminution of state sovereignty accompanied the States' ratification of the Civil War Amendments).
31. It is remedial since only when state-based remedies are not sufficient to
protect individuals' Fourteenth Amendment interests may Congress use Section
5 to explicitly abrogate state immunity to allow individuals to bring suit in federal courts. See Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. 445; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997). College Savings Bank bears out that Section 5 may be used only for enforcing rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, not for expanding the substantive nature of protectable rights. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-73.
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. It has been mentioned that Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment is the sole source of congressional authority to
abrogate sovereign immunity. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000).
33. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat.
3567 (1992) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1122, 1125(a), 1127 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998)). Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub.
L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296
(1994)).
The specific purpose for passing each act was to clarify Congress's "intent
that States and State entities are not immune" from infringement suits under
either patent or trademark laws. S. REP. NO. 102-280, at 1-2 (1992), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3087-88. The impetus for the PRCA in particular,
was the Federal Circuit's decision in Chew v. State of California, 893 F.2d 331
(Fed Cir. 1990), to dismiss an Ohio resident's patent infringement suit against
the State of California because the then-existing Patent Code did not meet the
so-called stringent test articulated by the Supreme Court in its decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). See S. REP. NO. 102-280,
at 5-6 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3091-92. In Atascadero, the
Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity proscribed a suit against California state entities that allegedly denied plaintiff employment due to his physical
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in the following subsection, the issues in College Savings
Bank and Florida Prepaid were whether Congress had overreached its Section 5 power by purporting to subject states to
34
private lawsuits in the TRCA and PRCA, respectively.
1. A FailedAttempt to Abrogate Under Section 5 for
State IntellectualProperty Infringement.
The factual background in College Savings Bank and
Florida Prepaid is as follows. The privately held College
Savings Bank marketed and sold certificates of deposit de5 The bank
signed to finance the cost of college education.
also held a patent on the method of administrating its certificates of deposit.3 6 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board ("Florida Prepaid"), a state entity, initiated an
allegedly similar program designed to help individuals with
future college expenses.37 College Savings Bank sued Florida
Prepaid in two separate suits, one alleging false advertising
38
and another alleging patent infringement.
In College Savings Bank, the false advertising case, the
Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity blocked Congress's effort to subject states to liability for false advertising
under the Lanham Act. 9 The plaintiff argued that the TRCA
was enacted to "remedy and prevent state deprivations with-

handicaps in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§794. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246. The Court stated that the Rehabilitation Act did not "evince an unmistakable congressional purpose, pursuant to §5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, to subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id. at 247. Thus, one criticism leveled at the majority
decision in FloridaPrepaidin finding the PRCA to be an impermissible attempt
for abrogating state immunity was that the Court was unfairly upping the ante
for what would be required for valid abrogation in the area of federal intellectual property. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 657-59 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-75; Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at
637-48.
35. See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 671.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. In College Savings Bank, the bank alleged that Florida Prepaid engaged
in unfair competition by making public misstatements about its own tuition
savings plans, a violation of §43(a) of the Lanham Act. See id. In FloridaPrepaid, the bank sued under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) for patent infringement. See Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 631.
39. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672.
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out due process of 'property' rights."" But the Court found no
basis to recognize the Lanham Act's false-advertising provisions as a Fourteenth Amendment property right. 41 Hence,
the provision in the TRCA abrogating state immunity could
not be based on the remedial power of Section 5, as there was
no property interest to be deprived of by the states.42
In Florida Prepaid, the patent infringement case, the
Supreme Court similarly held that Congress could not subject
states to damages liability for patent infringement.4 ' Even
though patents are recognizable property interests, 4 the
Court determined that the PRCA could not be justified as
"appropriate" enforcement legislation per Section 5
.5 Legislation is deemed appropriate when "[t]here [is] a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end. '46 Why the
TRCA failed this test was attributed to Congress's failure to
consider the availability of state remedies for patent infringement, the lack of evidence of a pattern of patent infringement by the states, and because the TRCA subjected
40. Specifically, College Savings Bank asserted that a right to be free from a
business competitor's false advertising about its own product and that a right to
be secure in one's business interests both amounted to "property" rights protectable by Congress through its Section 5 power via the TRCA. See id.
41. See id. at 673. The Lanham Act has provisions for both trademarks and
false-advertising. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (1994). The Court noted that
unlike false-advertising, trademarks are constitutionally cognizable property
rights. See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673. There was no issue regarding
trademark infringement in College Savings Bank.
While dismissing the argument that unfair competition claims can constitute property interests, the Court in College Savings Bank emphasized its commitment to keeping Congress from expanding substantive rights via Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 674. "To sweep
within the Fourteenth Amendment the elusive property interests that are ...
protected by unfair competition law would violate our frequent admonition that
the Due Process Clause is not merely a 'font of tort law."' Id.
42. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673. As will be discussed below, the
bank also argued that the state entity had waived its sovereign immunity.
43. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637-48. As in College Savings Bank,
the justices split five to four in FloridaPrepaid.
44. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 642.
45. Id. at 637, 647. The PRCA provision that purported to abrogate state
immunity states in part that "[a]ny State ...shall be subject to the provisions of
this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental
entity." 35 U.S.C. § 271(h).
46. Florida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 639. The test was explicated in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 637-39.
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states to expansive liability.4" The Court was cognizant that
the PRCA's "apparent and more basic aims were to provide a
uniform remedy for patent infringement and to place States
on the same footing as private parties."" Nonetheless, "a
State's infringement of a patent, through interfering with a
patent holder's right to exclude others, does not by itself violate the Constitution."4 9 Only where the state does not provide
adequate remedies for its own infringement will this result in
a deprivation of property without due process."
2. Is There a Need for Concern?
The Supreme Court's insistence on widespread intellectual property infringement before Congress can abrogate
state immunity was heralded as giving state entities an opendoor to take unfair advantage of their private sector counterparts.' On the other hand, there are arguments why states
47. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 644-47.
48. Id. at 647-48. The Court continued that while this was a proper Article
I concern, that article still did not give Congress power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See id. (referring to its prior holding in Seminole Tribe that Article I confers no abrogation power to Congress).
49. Id. at 64 3 .
50. See id. Justice Stevens aptly noted the inconsistency of relying upon
state-based resolution of patent infringement claims:
[Clonsistency, uniformity, and familiarity with the extensive and relevant body of patent jurisprudence are matters of overriding significance in this area of the law.
Patent infringement litigation often raises difficult technical issues
that are unfamiliar to the average trial judge. That consideration, as
well as the divergence among the federal circuits in their interpretation
of patent issues, provided support for the congressional decision in
1982 to consolidate appellate jurisdiction of patent appeals in the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Although that court has jurisdiction
over all appeals from federal trial courts in patent infringement cases,
it has no power to review state court decisions on questions of patent
law .... The reasons that motivated the creation of the Federal Circuit would be undermined by any exception that allowed patent infringement claims to be brought in state court.
Id. at 650-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citation omitted).
FloridaPrepaid has impacted another area of federal intellectual property.
Following this decision, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, declared that a state
university also has immunity from copyright infringement. See Chavez v. Arte
Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act was not a valid exercise of Section 5 where it abrogated state immunity).
51. See, e.g., David Malakoff, Critics Say Rulings Give State U. License to
Steal, 289 SCIENCE 2267 (2000).
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are unlikely to infringe private patent rights." To the extent
that patents are commercially valuable for states seeking to
profit from owning patents, it may be to the states' disadvantage in the long run, should the states not comply with the
rules placed upon private entities.5 3 Nonetheless, it seems
plausible that the potential ability of the states to use sovereign immunity as a defense will impact the cost of business
for private entities having intellectual property likely to be
infringed upon by states.54 One prediction is that private
firms may choose secrecy to protect technical know-how from
infringement.5 In tandem with secrecy, private firms may
come to rely upon contractual provisions in which state entities explicitly waive their immunity before agreeing to sales
and licensing arrangements.56
C. Proposed Solutions to Protect PatentRights when the
State Infringes Those Rights
Avenues of recourse against the states, when available,
have been generally inferior to relief under federal intellec52. States may be dissuaded from infringing for a number of reasons. For
example, certain legal remedies exist where state entities and state actors infringe recognizable constitutional interests. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing Ex Parte Young doctrine and inverse condemnation, inter alia). There
are also market, social, and political restraints upon states making infringement less likely. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relation-

ships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467 (2000); Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications

of State Sovereign Immunity From Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property
Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399 (2000).
Professor Bone is critical of any general prediction that states would either
commit widespread infringement of intellectual property rights or comply voluntarily with federal laws without the threat of legal sanction. Bone, supra, at
1469-70 (2000). He posits such predictions "ignore the availability of informal
mechanisms to assure compliance, such as nonlegal sanctions and reputational
effects, and they overlook the ways in which infringement can alter behavior
without actually being carried out." Id.
53. For example, private corporations may avoid doing business in and with
such a state. See Bone, supra note 52. For a detailed treatment of considerations impacting the pros and cons of state infringement, see Bone, supra note

52, at 1497-509.
54. See id.

55. See id. Professor Bone notes the unique problems that secrecy creates
in the university setting where there are concerns regarding the impact of secrecy on traditional academic values of openness and publicity as well as an
academic commitment to advancing public knowledge. See id. at 1508.
56. See id. at 1490.

2002]

CONDITIONAL WAIVERS

tual property statutes." The following section overviews
some of the proposed solutions applicable to overcoming state
immunity obstacles for the purpose of preserving the value of
the efforts expended towards obtaining a patent or copyright.
These solutions are presented primarily to point out their inherent limitations, and to show why alternative solutions are
desirable.
1. Avoid Making the State a Defendant by Suing the
"StateActor" Personally
There are severe limitations to this approach, but nonetheless it may be a possible avenue for certain forms of relief.58 For example, under Ex parte Young,59 prospective injunctive relief is possible through a suit brought against the
state official interfering with one's intellectual property
rights, which as a practical matter, binds the state itself."
The fact that state treasuries cannot be reached6 has not
prevented private citizens from successfully pursuing state
57. See Menell, supra note 52, at 1413. Hence, there was little incentive for
patent and copyright owners to pursue state remedies for state infringement
prior to Florida Prepaid. See id. It remains to be seen the extent, if any, to
which FloridaPrepaid undermines national uniformity by requiring that intellectual property rights get enforced via 50 different state-based systems.
58. See Bone, supra note 52. Professor Laurence Tribe has described the
distinction between suits against states and suits against officers as unsatisfacSee LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN
tory and conceptually unruly.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-27, at 558 (3d ed. 2000).
59. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
60. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
In Ex parte Young, the Court rationalized that when a state official acts to
enforce an unconstitutional state legislative act he is "stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of
his individual conduct." Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). But relief
was limited to prospective injunctive relief to prevent continuing violations. See
id. at 155-56. See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (refusing to
extend Ex parte Young to claims for retrospective relief). Even obtaining declaratory relief against the state or the state agent is unlikely to work, notwithstanding a federal act for declaratory relief. See Green, 474 U.S. at 71-74. Ex
parte Young may apply to state violations of federal law as well as to Constitutional violations. See id. (dictum).
61. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 463 (1945)
(holding that a suit for monetary damages paid out of a state treasury was a
suit against the state, and the state could invoke sovereign immunity even if
state officials were nominal defendants); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159 (1985) (holding that attorney's fees cannot be recovered from a state entity
under federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, where case was litigated against the
state agent in his personal capacity).
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officials for damages.62 The question that remains, however,
is whether federal courts have jurisdiction over suits brought
under Ex parte Young.63 A private citizen trying to obtain relief from a state official may be precluded from access to the
federal courts until state "legislative" and "administrative"
remedies are exhausted. 4 Alternatively, limiting what is considered to be the "arm of the state" might be another solution. 5
62. See, e.g., Richard Anderson Photograph v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122 (4th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a state actor could be sued in her individual capacity for
past damages under the Copyright Act). Practical restrictions, however, reduce
the likelihood of recovering money judgments from state actors. Daan Braveman, Enforcement of Federal Rights Against the States: Alden and Federalism
Nonsense, 49 AM. U.L. REV. 611, 649 (2000). For example, state actors may
have a qualified immunity or even be judgment-proof. See id. See also Kersavage v. Univ. of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330-32 (E.D. Tenn 1989) (ruling in
patent infringement suit that whether or not university professors were entitled
to qualified immunity was a fact issue precluding summary judgment).
63. See Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 208-09
(1929).
On the other hand, section 1338(a) of Title 28 confers exclusive and original
jurisdiction to federal district courts to hear all cases arising under copyright
and patent laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). Thus, federal preemption was
used to support why a suit should proceed in a federal forum against an employee of a public university for damages caused by the employee's alleged copyright infringement. See RichardAnderson Photograph,852 F.2d at 122-23 (deciding that the university itself could invoke immunity from lawsuit). The
circuit court assumed that the Supremacy Clause precludes the application of
state immunity law. See id. at 122. The argument ran that even though the
Constitution does not give Congress exclusive authority over copyright to the
exclusion of any state laws, the states cannot either enhance or diminish the
scope of protection afforded to those categories of writings that Congress determines worthy of national protection. See id. at 122-23 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553, 559 (1973)). Since the photographs in issue fell
within the national protection provided by the Copyright Act, "any immunity
provided by state law for violators of rights in those materials would obviously
diminish the scope of the Act's protection." Id. at 123. Thus, state law could
provide no immunity to the university employee in her individual capacity. See
id.
Of course, state courts may adjudicate patent law issues provided that they
collaterally arise under a cause of action over which the state court has subject
matter jurisdiction. See Dutch D. Chung, The Preclusive Effect of State Court
Adjudication of Patent Issues and the Federal Courts' Choice of PreclusionLaws,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 707, 726-27 (2000).
64. This will be more of a problem when state-based remedies are relied
upon, rather than federal infringement laws, to obtain relief from state actors.
Cf. Gilchrist, 279 U.S. at 208-09.
65. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (finding the constitution of the State of Nevada to explicitly provide for the liability of counties to
suit). Justice Steven's dissent in College Savings Bank pointed out that the

2002]

CONDITIONAL WAIVERS

619

2. Have the United States Bring Suit Against the State
State sovereign immunity does not apply when the
United States is the party suing the state." It may be possible for Congress to authorize the Attorney General to bring a
federal court suit in the name of the United States against
states that are engaging in patent or copyright infringement." In such a case, the owner of the patent would also
have to rely on additional legislation allowing recovery of any
damages awarded to the United States following a successful
lawsuit.68
3. Use TraditionalDevices for Protecting Constitutional
Rights
"The hallmark of a protected property interest is the
right to exclude others." 69 Patents and copyrights are property interests that may be afforded constitutional protection. °
The barrier to bringing a deprivation of property claim in federal court is that an individual may only bring the claim
when he is unable to get relief through state-based mechanisms.7 The deprivation of property by the state is not unconstitutional, unless it is either unaccompanied by just compensation, as in an inverse condemnation claim under the
procedural posture of that case required the assumption that Florida Prepaid
was an arm of the state. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 692 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He suggested limiting the coverage of "state sovereign immunity by treating the commercial enterprises of the States like the commercial enterprises of foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976." Id.
66. See United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 193 (1926).
67. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 55; see also Menell, supra note 52, 1443-44.
68. See Menell, supra note 52, at 1444.
69. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 673.
70. See, e.g., Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 197 (1857) ("For, by the laws
of the United States, the rights of a party under a patent are his private property. ...").
71. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999) ("[O]nly where the State provides no remedy, or
only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their
patent could a deprivation of property without due process result."); Williamson
County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (holding
that a takings claim brought in federal court against a local planning authority
would not be ripe for federal adjudication until the property owner had obtained
a final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his property
and had sought compensation through state procedures).
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Fifth Amendment, or when it is taken without due process of
law, as in a claim pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.12 The fact that copyrights and patents are intangible property should not preclude the use of an
inverse condemnation claim against a state infringing on
those rights. 3 But getting to a federal forum is unlikely without first exhausting state-based remedies.74
A recent Supreme Court opinion appears to revive the
long-nascent Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Thus, in Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,
the plaintiff used an "originalist" interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to argue that since the clause
purports to protect the right to acquire and control property,
the clause must also protect the right to acquire and enforce a
copyright.76 The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument because
it was presented too late in the litigation, and because the
Supreme Court offered no guidance for its "modern" interpretation of the clause.77 This result suggests that a similar argument might be successful in the future.
72. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 (1999); Williamson County Reg'l
PlanningComm'n, 473 U.S. at 194.
73. See Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000). Professor Ghosh notes that between patents and
copyrights, patents are the easiest case for a takings approach since the fair use
doctrine raises difficulties for finding a state taking of copyrighted works. See
id. at 688-91. See also Menell, supra note 52, for a more thorough treatment of
federal and state inverse condemnation proceedings.
74. This would appear to be the case for deprivations under either the Due
Process Clause or the Just Compensation Clause under the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments, respectively. See Forida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 643 (due process); Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 194 (1985) (just
compensation).
75. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). Previously, the decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), had effectively rendered
the Privileges and Immunities Clause a nullity. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 377 (1997).
76. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir. 2000). Note
however, that the author of the copyrighted materials in Chavez did not make
this argument to show that she had been directly deprived. See id. Instead, she
asserted that the Privileges and Immunities Clause provided a basis for the
proper exercise of Congress's Section 5 power in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act. See id.. She sued the University of Houston under the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act. See id. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that if the
clause were to work to the author's advantage, then she could have claimed a
direct deprivation from the outset of the litigation. See id.
77. See Chavez, 204 F.3d at 608.
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4. Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was to allow suits in federal court whenever a citizen's rights secured by the Constitution and federal laws are either not enforced or are violated
by any person acting under color of state law."8 For example,
§ 1983 could be used against state employees for violation of
federal patent laws as means to ensure that state employees
conform to federal norms in respecting intellectual property."9
Alternatively, § 1983 could be used where a state employee's
patent infringement is alleged to violate the Takings and Due
Process Clauses. 80 The most serious obstacles for using §
1983 is that it does not provide a mechanism around the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and where constitutional claims are made, relief may have to be sought in state
courts and agencies before a federal court forum is granted.8 '
In some suits the relief sought will have to be limited to prospective injunctive relief.8" Other problems may be encountered if § 1983 is relied upon to provide a cause of action.83

78. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); District of Columbia v. Carter 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
79. See Bone, supra note 52, at 1488 (noting that it is not at all clear that
this would be allowed by the Supreme Court). See, e.g., Wright v Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (upholding damages suit under
§ 1983 where state public housing authority had charged rents exceeding those
permitted the Federal Housing Act).
80. See Bone, supra note 52, at 1488.
81. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (noting that "Section 1983 does not explicitly
and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity of the States .... ."); Walton v. Div. of Revenue, 961 F. Supp. 97 (1997); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Ware v. Wyoming Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 973
F. Supp. 1339 (1997); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 46 U.S. 232, 237-48 (1974).
82. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974). On the other hand, if a case can be made out that where the state
has obligated itself, either through contractual obligations or by statute, to be
subject to indemnification, then the state will have to pay out damages in those
particular circumstances. See Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir. 1986)
(ruling that state indemnity statute does not bring Eleventh Amendment into
play and thus no bar to recovery in § 1983); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d
645, 650-51 (7th Cir. 1985) ("If the state chooses to pick up the tab for its errant
officers, its liability for their torts is voluntary.").
83. See Bone, supra note 52, at 1488.
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5. ObtainingRelief Through State Judicialand
Administrative Systems
The dissent in FloridaPrepaidremarked that it was particularly ironic to use Congress's lack of review of state remedies for patent infringement as a basis for the Court's holding." This was because Congress reasonably assumed that
there were no state remedies since it had pre-empted state
jurisdiction over patent infringement. 5 Undoubtedly, intellectual property owners are now pursuing creative, and in
some circumstances, largely untested, approaches to enforcement of rights in state courts and administrative tribunals."
Some relevant considerations for pursuing state actions
are as follows. First, moving to a state forum does not overcome state immunity to a lawsuit per se.87 Second, state
claims are usually narrower in scope than their federal counterparts.88 Third, state procedures may be less favorable to
plaintiffs, since state court judges lack the expertise of the
federal judiciary, particularly that of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals. 9 Finally, there is the risk of having certain
state actions preempted by federal law.9 °
Possible avenues of judicial relief may include state inverse condemnation procedures, and claims sounding in tort
and contract.91 These may not be available in some states."
Nonetheless, the majority opinion in FloridaPrepaidfound it
"worth mentioning that the State of Florida provides reme84. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 657-58 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. See id.
86. See Menell, supra note 52, at 1413. Furthermore, modes of legal recourse will vary across the different states. See id.
87. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
88. See Bone, supra note 52, at 1492.
89. See id. One explicit reason that Congress created the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals was to ensure national uniformity in patent law. See Chung,
supra note 63.
90. See Bone, supra note 52, at 1494. Professor Bone comments that preemption is hardly a certainty, even if state created rights duplicate federal laws
in patent and copyright. See id. This is because preemption turns on congressional intent, and "Congress did not intend to preempt state law when that law
is used to fill gaps that Congress meant to fill but could not because of Eleventh
Amendment obstacle." Id.
91. Adequate coverage of the state forms of relief is beyond the scope of this
comment. A good overview of the topic can be found in Menell, supra note 52.
92. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-60 (1991) (claims against Alabama may only
be brought administratively).
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dies to patent owners for alleged infringement on the part of
the State including a claims bill for payment in full... or a
judicial remedy through a takings or conversion claim."93
6. Could CongressAbrogate Sovereign Immunity out of
Concern for Respecting Relations with Foreign
Nations?
The United States is signatory to international treaties
that involve intellectual property.94 Professor Menell has
suggested that the decisions in College Savings Bank and
FloridaPrepaid could undermine the United States' international treaty obligations and foreign diplomacy.9" Menell suggests that congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity for infringement of federal intellectual property rights
directly supports adherence to U.S. treaty obligations and the
pursuit of foreign relations goals.9"
In fact, a recent unanimous Supreme Court decision,
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,97 manifests the respect the Court gives to international policy relations. The
caveat is that Crosby was about the ability of a state to regulate commerce within it own borders.9" A state may not

93. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 n.9 (1999) (citing FLA. STAT. ch. 11.065 (1997) as the basis for a
claims bill and Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 626 So.2d
1333 (Fla. 1993) as an example where the Florida Supreme Court allowed a suit
to proceed in state court where takings and conversion claims over personal
property rights were alleged.) A suit in which a patentee alleged an unconstitutional taking by the State of Florida of their patents was recently rejected on
the basis of sovereign immunity, but in this case the patentees brought suit in a
federal district court, not state court.

See State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v.

State of Florida, 258 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001). As Justice Scalia stated: "A
State does not consent to suit in federal court merely by consenting to suit in

the courts of its own creation." Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178
U.S. 436, 441-45 (1900)).

There is a political solution. If private entities want to be able to sue a
state for patent infringement, nothing precludes private entities from lobbying
the state legislature to enact that legislation waiving state immunity.
94. See Menell, supra note 52, at 1448-64.
95. See id. at 1448.
96. See id. at 1464.

97. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
98. In Crosby, the Supreme Court held invalid a statute enacted by Massa-

chusetts that regulated state contracts with companies doing business with
Burma (Myanmar). See id. at 373.
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regulate in a way that conflicts with national prerogatives.9 9
The issue of whether Congress may abrogate state immunity
pursuant to international treaty might be considered a horse
of different a color. For one, it would seem perverse to champion the right of the states to be immune from the normal
congressional powers, but turn around and premise abrogation on an international agenda. Champions of state rights
are usually concerned about the lack of political accountability, '00 and to let terms of international treaties trump states'
rights seems to disrespect that accountability. ' 9' Another
consideration is that treaties supercede state concerns only on
the basis of the Supremacy Clause. °2 The constitutional
guarantee of state immunity from private lawsuit arises from
the Eleventh Amendment. 93 In the 1790's, when Congress
was considering the provisions to include in the text of the
Eleventh Amendment, it was decided that no exception to
state immunity should be made for "cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the United States." 4 For
these reasons it would seem that congressional abrogation of
state immunity on the basis of international treaties could
not work.'
D.

Waivers

No court has jurisdiction to hear a suit by a private citizen against a state until that state unequivocally expresses
its intention to waive its sovereign immunity. '
Waivers
99. See id. at 374-80.
100. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
101. Cf. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (holding
that in absence of consent, the state of Mississippi is immune from a suit
brought by a foreign state for payment of alleged debt since the proposed suit
did not raise a question of national concern).
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
103. U.S. CONST. amend XI.
104. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 476 (1794).
105. See also Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of
Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix"Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79
TEX. L. REv. 1037, 1173-95 (2001) (concluding that the treaty power cannot
support forms of abrogation that would be impermissible if undertaken pursuant to Congress's other Article I powers, but that it may be possible for the
United States to bring on behalf of foreign intellectual property plaintiffs
against infringing states).
106. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730, 757-78 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-76 (1999);
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therefore, cannot be implied." 7 Even so, there are different
ways in which a state might express its consent. For example, a state may make declarations through its constitution or
statutes regarding whether certain causes of actions may be
brought against it.' A state may also affirmatively invoke a
court's0 9 jurisdiction by bringing a suit against a private
party.
The pertinent question is, what checks are on the Federal
Government as it elicits the states' voluntary consent to private lawsuit? In this regard it is helpful to understand why
in College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court "expressly over-

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) ("We have
insisted ... that the State's consent be unequivocally expressed."); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (stating that the "test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one").
107. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999).
108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 768.28; 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §8522 (West 2001).

However, caution must be exercised in interpreting the language of a provision, and attention paid to whose interpretation will prevail. E.g., Great N. Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1994) (dismissing a case against an Oklahoma
state officer for want of federal jurisdiction turning on the issue of how Oklahoma would interpret a state statute); Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative
Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981) (holding no waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity despite state statute expressing intent to "sue
and be sued"). A state does not consent to suit by authorizing suits against it
"in any court of competent jurisdiction." Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676 (citing
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S 573, 577-79 (1946)). The
Supreme Court has also "held that a State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its waiver and apply those
changes to a pending suit." Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676 (citing Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1858)).
A number of states have expressed intention not to consent. See, e.g., W.
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35 ("The State of West Virginia shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity . . . ."); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (stating
"[that the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of
law or equity").
109. See Georgia Dep't of Revenue v. Burke (In re Burke), 146 F.3d 1313,
1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the state waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity by filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings), cert. denied, 527
U.S. 1043 (1999); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 488 (1883) (stating that by
voluntarily appearing in a federal interpleader action and prosecuting a claim
to the fund in controversy, the State of Rhode Island voluntarily submitted to
the federal court's jurisdiction). Note however, that a state plaintiff does not
waive its sovereign immunity with respect to all plausible counterclaims. See
Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 502 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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ruled" Parden v. Terminal Railway,"' and struck down a theory of constructive waivers (Parden-typewaivers) as unconstitutional."' As discussed in the next section, the problems
with Parden-type constructive waivers are that they became
effective without a state's manifestation of consent, and that
without quid pro quo for the state's waiver, the Parden-type
waiver essentially amounts to abrogation without a constitutional basis. The subsequent subsection focuses upon conditional waivers.
1. An UnconstitutionalAttempt to Create Constructive
Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity
In Parden, employees of a railroad owned and operated
by Alabama were permitted to sue the State under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA")."' The suit was allowed even though no provisions in FELA specifically referred
to the states, and furthermore, Alabama law expressly disavowed any such waiver." 3 Parden held that FELA authorized suits against the states by virtue of its general provision
subjecting to suit every railroad common carrier engaging in
commerce between the several states."4
Calling Parden the "nadir" of its waiver and sovereign
immunity jurisprudence,"' College Savings Bank resolved
that the constructive waiver notion was ill conceived and expressly overruled Parden."6 There are two major concerns
unmet in the Parden-type constructive waiver rendering
these waivers invalid. First, with Parden-type waivers Congress may dislodge state immunity without leaving leeway for
a state's manifestation of consent to the waiver.'' Justice
Scalia noted:
There is a fundamental difference between a State's expressing unequivocally that it waives its immunity, and
110. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
111. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 681.
112. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 196.
113. See id. at 192; see also Coll. Sav.Bank, 527 U.S. at 676-77.
114. See Parden, 377 U.S. at 192; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676-77.
115. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676-77.
116. Id. at 680.
117. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680 ("The whole point of requiring a
"clear declaration" by the State of its waiver is to be certain that the
State in
fact consents to suit.").
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Congress's expressing unequivocally its intention that if
the State takes certain action it shall be deemed to have
waived that immunity. In the latter situation, the most
that can be said with certainty is that the State has been
put on notice that Congress intends to subject it to suits
brought by individuals. That is very far from concluding
that the State made an 'altogether voluntary' decision to
waive its immunity."'

The second concern is that the "asserted basis for constructive waiver is conduct that the State realistically could
choose to abandon, that is undertaken for profit, that is traditionally performed by private citizens and corporations, and
that otherwise resembles the behavior of 'market participants."" 9 The Court noted that "[in the sovereign-immunity
context... '[e]venhandness' between individuals and States
is not to be expected: 'The constitutional role of the States
' '0
sets them apart from other employers and defendants.""
The majority opinion distinguished Parden-type constructive
waivers, which impermissibly attempt to exact a waiver from
a state's otherwise lawful activity, from the "fundamentally
118. Id. at 680-81. Justice Scalia equated state sovereign immunity with the
right to trial by jury in criminal cases, both being constitutionally protected.
See id. at 682. He noted that the classic description of a waiver of a constitutional right is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege," and that courts indulge "every reasonable presumption" against
such waivers. Id. at 682 (quoting Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
and Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937), respectively).
119. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 684. In College Savings Bank, the private party ("Bank") had to compete with the state entity ("Board") for customers
to buy certificates of deposit designed to finance college costs. See id. at 627.
Assume, arguendo, that had the Board been a private entity, the Bank would
have been successful on the merits. As such, it seems unfair that the Board
could engage in behavior that would be off-limits to any other private entity.
The Bank's argument was that since the State of Florida, as the Board, was not
acting as a regulator of the marketplace, but as a regular participant within it,
the Board should be held to the same liabilities as any other participant. See id.
at 685. The so-called "market participant" exception is a doctrine usually
evoked by states in response to accusations of violating the judicially created
dormant Commerce Clause restrictions, and which should be limited to that
area of jurisprudence, according to the majority in College Savings Bank. See
id. at 685. "In contrast, a suit by an individual against an uncontesting State is
the very evil at which the Eleventh Amendment is directed - and it exists
whether or not the State is acting for profit, in a traditionally 'private' enterprise, and as a 'market participant.'" Id.
120. Id. at 685-86 (quoting Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Public
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 477 (1987)).
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different" situation where the Federal Government conditionally offers a gift or gratuity and exacts a waiver of sovereign
immunity from a state in return. 2 '
Referring to Congress's attempt to subject states to private lawsuit in the TRCA, Justice Scalia noted that "[i]n the
present case ... what Congress threatens if the State refuses

to agree to its condition is not the denial of a gift or gratuity,
but a sanction: exclusion of the State from otherwise permissible activity."'22 Quid pro quo applies to conditional waivers:
the Federal Government may ask the states to give up their
immunity to private lawsuit in return for some benefit that
the Federal Government has the power to bestow.
2. Case Studies of ConditionalWaivers: FourDifferent
Article I Powers Congress has Used to Conditionally
Waive State Sovereignty
To facilitate comparison between the contexts in which
conditional waivers have been found, the following cases have
been categorized in terms of benefit flowing from a particular
grant of authority to Congress through Article I of the Constitution.
a. Compact Clause...
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission124 has

been cited as support for the proposition that Congress can
request that States waive their sovereignty in return for federal benefits. 25 Indubitably, all the justices in Petty agreed
121. See id. at 686 (distinguishing Parden-type waivers from the circumstances of Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bride Comm'n, 359 US 275 (1959) and
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)).
122. Id. at 687.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State...
124. 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
125. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 107 F.
Supp. 2d 653, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that support for conditional waivers
is found in College Savings Bank's approving discussions of the decisions in
Petty and Dole); Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 317
(4th Cir. Md. 2001) (dissenting opinion) (citing both Petty and Dole as endorsements by the Supreme Court of validity of conditional waivers); Entergy Ark.,
Inc. v. Nebraska, 68 F. Supp.2d 1093, 1102 (D. Neb. 1999); New Star Lasers,
Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1243 (E.D. Cal. 1999);
McGuire v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 2000 WL 1459435, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 21, 2000).
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that Congress could condition its consent of interstate compacts. 12' Dicta suggest that Congress could even insist "upon
a provision waiving immunity from suit in the federal courts
' 127 The
as the price of obtaining its consent to the Compact.'
issue, however, was not so much about whether Congress
could place a condition on its consent, but whether a particular provision in the compact amounted to a waiver, as the
following explains.
In Petty, the States of Missouri and Tennessee sought to
28
build a bridge across the Mississippi River.' A compact was
prepared by the two States conferring authority to a bi-state
commission for building the bridge and operating ferries
across the river. 9 The Constitution mandates that "No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any
2 ° The compact
Agreement or Compact with another State."'
as it was submitted to Congress contained a clause in which
the bi-state commission had the power "to contract, to sue
and be sued in its own name." ' When Congress gave its consent to the compact, it reserved "the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to act in any matter arising under the compact over
which they have jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the
stream and that interstate comMississippi is a navigable
32
involved.'
is
merce
126. The majority stated that "Congress must exercise national supervision
through its power to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it under appropriate
conditions." Petty, 359 U.S. at 282 n.7. The dissent similarly explained that
"[tihe constitutional requirement of consent by Congress to a Compact between
the States was designed for the protection of national interests by the power to
withhold consent or to grant it on condition of appropriate safeguards of those
interests." Id. at 288 (dissenting opinion).
127. Id. at 288 (dissenting opinion).
128. See id. at 277.
129. See id.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. In Petty, Justice Douglas explained that
"[tihe States who are parties to the compact by accepting it and acting under it
assume the conditions that Congress under the Constitution attached." Petty,
359 U.S. at 281-82. Justice Douglas elaborated that Congress's Constitutional
power to condition agreements by the states serves a national interest to which
Congress is more naturally suited to look after. Id. at 282 n.7.
131. Petty, 359 U.S. at 277.
132. Id. at 281. Congress approved the compact in 1949. See id. at 280. No
doubt exists that Congress "conditioned" its acceptance of the compact on the
states' agreement to Congress's terms. See id. at 282. The crux of the matter,
and what divided the Court in Petty, was to what extent did Congress intend to
"reserve the jurisdictions" of the federal courts?
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After an accident resulting in the death of her husband,
Naomi Petty brought suit for negligence against the bi-state
'
commission in federal court. 33
The basis for suing in federal
court was that Naomi Petty claimed that the "sue and be
sued" clause in the compact amounted to a waiver of state
immunity."
Under state law such a clause did not authorize private
suit for negligence against the bi-state commission.13 The issue before the Court was whether the meaning of the "sue
and be sued" clause should be determined using federal or
state law.'36 Petty held that Congress reserved this question
for the federal courts to resolve using federal law to interpret
the compact and not state law.'37 The Court's interpretation
was that "sue and be sued" constituted a waiver of immunity
to private lawsuit.'38
Thus, in Petty, the Court determined that Congress did
not impose upon the states the condition that they waive
their immunity from private lawsuit.'39 Instead, Congress reserved the right of federal courts to resolve disputes arising
over the meaning and effect of the compact and to retain their
jurisdiction over cases involving navigable waters and interstate commerce. 4 °
Is this a revisionist interpretation of Petty? Perhaps not.
First, in the dissent, Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker noted that were it not for the "sue and be sued" clause
in the compact, the case would not have been heard in the
federal courts despite the fact that the commission was operating a vessel on navigable water and in interstate commerce.' Their key objection to the majority opinion was that
133. See id. at 276. Naomi Petty was the wife of Faye R. Petty, who had been
an employee of the Tennessee-Missouri Commission. See id. Mr. Petty died after being trapped in the pilothouse of the Commission's ferryboat as it sank after colliding with another boat. See id. Naomi Petty was the Administratrix of
her husband's estate. See id.
134. The Federal District Court dismissed the complaint citing the Commission's immunity as a state entity, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. See id. at
276.
135. See id. at 279.
136. See id.
137. See Petty, 359 U.S. at 279-83.
138. See id. at 282-83.
139. See id. at 279-83.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 288 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that
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state law should have been used to interpret the "sue and be
sued" clause."' Second, Justices Black, Clark, and Stewart
concurred in the opinion of the Court "with the understanding
that we do not reach the constitutional question as to whether
the Eleventh Amendment immunizes from suit agencies created by two or more States under state compacts which the
'
Constitution requires to be approved by the Congress." '
Thus, for six Justices, the chief issue in Petty was merely
whose authority is used to interpret a bi-state compact, not
whether state immunity applied.'
b. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to regulate interstate commerce.'46 For example, in 1934 Congress
4
began regulating interstate telephone service," in part to
protect American consumers from AT&T's emerging monopoly.' 47 The following "telephone" cases illustrate certain circumstances where the Federal Government may give states
an opportunity to participate in the regulation of a commercial activity, but in doing so states remain accountable by
waiving their immunity to certain private lawsuits.
The telephone cases came about as result of the Telethe Eleventh Amendment precluded a federal forum for this case from the outset since it involved only a tort claim. See id.
142. See id. Keeping in mind that the dissent thought this case should not
have been in a federal forum to begin with, it would seem very odd for them not
to address the fact Congress was allowed to "waive" state immunity by its approval of the compact-if that is what the majority opinion stood for. The dissent was more focused on the issue of whether or not the states had the prerogative to interpret the "sue and be sued" provision for themselves. Id.
143. Petty, 359 U.S. at 283.
144. States can waive immunity through contractual obligations. See Beers
v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858). So if the suability clause isinterpreted as a waiver of immunity, then the bi-state commission should have
been subject to suit. But Congress did not condition its approval on the "sue
and be sued" clause being present in the compact. See Petty, 359 U.S. at 277. In
other words, the private lawsuit against the bi-state commission in Petty was
allowed to proceed, not because Congress had mandated it per se, but because
the states' were contractually obliged.
145. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
146. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West 1991 & Supp. 2000)).
147. See Michael Kerf & Damien Geradin, ControllingMarket Power in Telecommunications:Antitrust vs. Sector-Specific Regulation: An Assessment of the
United States, New Zealand and Australian Experiences, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 919, 936 (1999).
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communications Act of 1996 ("Telecommunications Act"). 48
Consequent to AT&T's dismantling, the Telecommunications
Act established baseline rules for companies entering the
telecommunications field. 9 Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act sets forth provisions under which incumbent telecommunications carriers work out agreements with new carriers."'5 These agreements are subject to approval or rejection
by state commissions."' But when a state commission "fails to
act out its responsibility", then the Federal
Communications
152
'
authority.
its
exert
may
Commission
In MCI Telecommunication Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Tenth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to hold that a state entity, here the Utah Public Service
Commission, had conditionally waived its sovereign immunity
by conducting arbitrations as authorized by section 252 of the
Telecommunications Act.'58 Since MCI Telecommunications
was decided, "at least 14 district courts and three of four circuit courts to address this issue have concluded that a state
commission's participation in the arbitration scheme established under the Act effectuates a non-verbal voluntary
waiver of the state commission's [sovereign] immunity .. .
Unlike the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, the
Fourth Circuit in Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., declined to find that a state commission had
waived its immunity by participating in the administration of
the Telecommunications Act.'
But according to the Fourth
Circuit, this was only because section 252 merely provides
"for federal court review of State commission determinations,
148. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2000)).
149. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 933
(10th Cir. 2000) (citing Deonne L. Bruning, The Telecommunications Act of
1996: The Challenge of Competition, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1255, 1258 (1997)).

150. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(1); MCI Telecomms., 216 F.3d at 933.
151. See MCI Telecomms., 216 F.3d at 933.
152. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(e)(5); MCI Telecomms., 216 F.3d at 934.
153. See MCI Telecomms., 216 F.3d at 938-39.
154. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497
(N.D.N.Y. 2001). See, e.g., federal circuit court decisions: AT&T Communs. v.
BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001); MCI Telecomms. Corp.
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2000).
155. See Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.
2001).
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but it does not provide that the State commission thereby
agrees to be named as a party... or that it waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity."'56 In other words, the problem
was one of putting the states on notice and eliciting their consent to waive immunity, not that Congress could not enact a
conditional waiver.
c.

Spending Clause" 7

In South Dakota v. Dole, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that incident to the spending power, "Congress may attach
conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly
employed the power to 'further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.""5 8 Moreover, the scope of the spending power to the
"general welfare" is construed broadly. That is, through the
spending power and conditional grants, Congress may
authorize expenditures for meeting objectives that are beyond
Article I's enumerated legislative fields. 9
In Dole, the Supreme Court put forth a test ("Dole test")
to assess whether Congress's use of conditional spending exceeded general constitutional requirements. 60 Although the
condition in Dole did not include a waiver of state sovereignty, the Dole test nonetheless remains the best approximation of the Court's criteria for analyzing grants conditioned on
such a waiver.' 6' Subsection (i) explains the Dole test, and
156. Id. at 290. It is very possible that the Fourth Circuit would have gone
along with the other circuits had Congress only been more clear that it was using a conditional waiver basis to retain federal court jurisdiction. See id. at 29394 ("[We have searched in vain for any statement of congressional intent to
condition a State utility commission's participation in the Telecommunications
Act's regulatory scheme on the waiver of its constitutionally predicated sovereign immunity.").
157. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.").
158. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 296 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)). Accord New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992) (holding that although Congress cannot directly compel
state legislative or regulatory action, it can induce behavior by putting conditions on grants).
159. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
160. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08, 211.
161. See Berman et al., supra note 105, at 1131. Berman et al. are somewhat
critical of the Dole test, at least where it impacts upon conditional waiver the-
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subsection (ii) presents a number of circuit court decisions in
which conditional waivers of sovereignty were upheld in a
conditional spending context.
i.

The Dole Decision

In 1984, Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds, which
were otherwise allocable, from States having a minimum
drinking age of under twenty-one years."' At the time, South
Dakota allowed individuals nineteen years of age and older to
purchase certain alcoholic beverages. 63
South Dakota
brought suit in the United States District Court requesting a
declaratory judgement that the spending condition violated
constitutional limitations on the congressional exercise of the
spending power.1 4 The Constitution empowers Congress to
"lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
welfare of the United States."'65
In Dole, the Court did not address the issue of whether
Congress could set a national minimum drinking age directly.'66 Futhermore, it was clear that Congress could attach
conditions to the receipt of federal funds.'67 The issue was
whether Congress could indirectly set a national minimum
drinking age by attaching a condition to federal funds without
contradicting the Twenty-First Amendment.'
The importance of Dole is that the Court explicated a five-part test
which can be used to analyze the validity of any conditions
Congress attaches to the receipt of federal funds.'69 The test
is presented below.
ory. See id. at 1143.

162. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
163. See id.

164. See id. South Dakota argued that the Twenty-First Amendment was
the major "constitutional limitation" which made Congress's spending condition
invalid. Id. The Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution
imparts to the states the right to regulate the sale of alcohol within their own
borders. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
166. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206.
167. See id. at 207.

168. Id. at 206-07. The Court held that it was a valid exercise of its spending
power for Congress to condition a state's receipt of federal highway funds on the
adoption of a minimum drinking age. See id. at 212.

169. See id. at 207-08, 211.
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First, the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general welfare. 7 ' Second, Congress must condition the states' receipt of federal funds unambiguously, enabling the states to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant
of the consequences of their participation (the "voluntariness"
limitation). 7' Third, there must be a relationship between
the conditions on the grant and the federal interest in promoting national projects or programs (the "germaneness"
limitation).'
Fourth, the conditions must not be barred by
other constitutional provisions. "'
Finally, the conditions
must not be so "coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.""74
ii.

Waiving Sovereignty as a Condition on
Spending: The "Spending Cases"

In 1986, Congress enacted a general provision declaring
that state recipients of federal financial assistance will not be
immune to suits if found in violation of federal antidiscrimination statutes. "' This provision in section 1003 of
the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 states:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in
Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 7941, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.], the
Age Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.],
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d
170. See id. at 207.
171. See id. This limitation on the spending power was first elucidated in
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). See Dole,
483 U.S. at 207.
172. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.
173. See id. at 208.
174. Id. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
The majority opinion in Dole suggested that this limitation only comes into play
in "some circumstances" where the effect of withholding the benefit surpasses
the point of "encouragement" to get the states to conform to desired national
agenda. Id. at 211. In Dole, the loss South Dakota would suffer by not enacting
the suitable minimum drinking age for consumption of alcohol would be relatively mild, i.e., the loss of "5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified
highway grant programs." Id.
175. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 § 1003, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7
(1994).
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et seq.], or the provisions of any other Federal statute
prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.170
The Supreme Court appeared to give tacit approval to
section 1003's conditional waiver of state immunity in Lane v.
Pena, in which the Court held that section 1003 did not waive
the Federal Government's sovereign immunity. 7 7 Thereafter,
Federal Courts of Appeal from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits all found that section 1003 conferred a valid conditional waiver for violation of one or another of the anti-discrimination acts enumerated in the text of
section 1003.178 It is interesting to note only one circuit was
poised to analyze the waiver in terms of the Dole test, but the
state entity merely argued that "it is constitutionally impossible for Congress to require the States to waive the Eleventh
Amendment as a condition of receiving federal funds," and
did not supply evidence for analysis under the Dole test.'79
Noting that language of section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act "tracks precisely" with that in section 1403 of the In-

176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994).
177. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996). The Court stated: "Given
the care with which Congress responded to our decision in Atascadero by crafting an unambiguous waiver of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in §
1003, it would be ironic indeed to conclude that that same provision 'unequivocally' establishes a waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity .... Id. In Atascadero, the Court found that a general authorization for
suit, as in a federal statute providing remedies for "any recipient of Federal assistance," still "falls far short of manifesting a clear intent" that a conditional
waiver of state sovereign immunity is present when a state accepts funds under
the federal program. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 24547 (1985).
178. See Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999) (Title
IX), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d
858, 876 (5th Cir. 2000) (Title IX); Cherry v. Univ. of Wis. Sys. Bd. of Regents,
265 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2001) (Title IX); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340 (7th
Cir. 2000) (Rehabilitation Act); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1080,
(8th Cir. 2000) (section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Clark v. California, 123
F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998) (section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act). A decision by the Eleventh Circuit that found a conditional waiver, Sandoval v.Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir. 1999), was reversed
in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held that Title VI does not
confer a private right of action, and that in this context section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act was not relevant since it applied only to violations of federal
statutes, but did not create new rights.
179. See Litman, 186 F.3d at 552-53.
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dividuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 8° the
Eighth Circuit found a conditional waiver to be inherent in
the IDEA.'8 ' But having already found the IDEA valid on the
basis of Congress's abrogation power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,18 the Eighth Circuit did not undertake to further analyze the merits of the conditional waiver in
terms of the Dole test.
d. Patent Clause183
In New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the University of
California, a federal district court allowed an action to go
forward which sought a declaration of invalidity on a patent
held by the Regents of the University of California ("Regents"), despite the Regents' motion to dismiss on the basis of
the Regents' sovereign immunity as a state entity. 8 4 Ex-

plaining that a patent constitutes a "gift or gratuity," the district court found that the PRCA constitutes a clear and unmistakable waiver,'85 which the Regents presumably knew of
when they acquired the patent in question.'86 This decision is
somewhat problematic in that there is nothing in the PRCA
that explicitly states that as a condition upon receiving a fed180. The IDEA "provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in
educating handicapped children, and conditions such funding upon a State's
compliance with extensive goals and procedures." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 179 (1982).
181. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 831-32 (8th Cir.
1999); accord Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000).
182. See Mauney, 183 F.3d at 831.
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
184. See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d
1240 (E.D. Cal. 1999). The plaintiff did not raise Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), as a way to avoid state immunity. See id. at 1242 n.1.
185. This was found despite the fact the PRCA was not sufficient to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. See supra notes 33, 45-50 and accompanying text.
186. See New Star Lasers, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1244-45. The court stated that it
"can conceive of no other context in which a litigant may lawfully enjoy all the
benefits of a federal property or right, while rejecting its limitations." Id. The
district court purported to be following the "common sense understanding" of
the Petty, Dole, and College Savings Bank decisions. Id.
A similar argument had been previously advanced by Judge Newman of the
Federal Circuit in Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, 143
F.3d 1446, 1453 (Fed Cir. 1998), but this decision was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, Inc., 527 U.S. 1031
(1999), and the case settled out of court. See Marcia Barinaga, Genentech, UC
Settle Suit for $200 Million, 286 SCIENCE 1655 (1999).
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eral patent, a State is deemed to have waived its sovereign
immunity. 87 In fact, a more narrow reading of New Star Lasers suggests that the court would only have found a waiver
in the context of a declaratory judgement action where the
state entity "capitalized on [the] uncertainty [of patent validity or invalidity] by threatening,
but never consummating, in188
fringement litigation."

III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
The objective of this comment is to propose a way by
which Congress might enact a constitutionally sound statutory scheme that conditions the receipt of patent rights upon
a state's waiver of sovereign immunity from private lawsuit.
The goal of the following analysis is to identify concerns that
arise out of the use of conditional waivers by Congress to
achieve national objectives in patent law.
The analysis is broken down into four subsections. First,
general problems facing the use of conditional waivers by
Congress are presented. Second, the comment analyzes general arguments regarding reasons to permit conditional waivers. The third subsection addresses the reasoning that some
courts use to find conditional waivers permissible without a
consideration of the Dole test, and explains why meeting the
Dole test is requisite for trading patent rights for a conditional waiver in a patent law context. The final subsection
187. However, the PRCA was explicit in conveying the congressional intent
to abrogate state sovereignty. For example, a provision of the PRCA states in
part:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity,
shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a patent
under section 271, or for any other violation under this title.
35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1992).
188. New Star Lasers, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. The court continued: "Amenability to a suit challenging the validity of a patent thus is not only a quid pro
quo-it is an integral part of the patent scheme as a whole." Id.
The reasoning in New Star Lasers was adopted in McGuire v. Regents of the
University of Michigan, in which a suit was allowed to proceed for declaratory
relief that plaintiff had not infringed or diluted a federally registered trademark
held by a state entity. See McGuire v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 2000 WL
1459435 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2000).
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seeks to address more specifically how the Dole test may be
met in these circumstances.
IV. ANALYSIS
The General Problems with Conditional Waivers
The Supreme Court has "stressed... that abrogation of
sovereign immunity upsets the fundamental constitutional
balance between the Federal Government and the States ...
placing a considerable strain on the principles of federalism
that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine."' 9 While abrogation is permissible under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution,'9" the Court prohibits Congress's use of its Article I powers to abrogate sovereign immunity."' Thus, the general argument against conditional
waivers on federal grants made pursuant to Article I is that
this procedure allows Congress to achieve indirectly what it
cannot constitutionally achieve directly.'92
Even if this view was not convincing enough to carry the
day,'9 3 the following arguments advanced in its support are
useful for elucidating the concerns that may render a condi-

A.

189. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
190. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
191. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73
(1996).
192. This is a particular incarnation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions which "holds that government may not grant a benefit on the condition
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold that benefit altogether." See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989). This doctrine usually
arises in the context of individual rights, not states' rights. See Berman et al.,
supra note 105, 1130 n.459. However, "State sovereign immunity, no less than
the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected." Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
682 (1999). The Court recognizes the possibility of an illegitimate exercise of
government power with respect to private rights. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thorton, 541 U.S. 779, 829 (1995). The Court states: "As we have often noted,
constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be ...indirectly denied .... The Constitution nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded
modes of infringing on constitutional protection." Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
193. See cases cited supra notes 154, 178 and 181. Such decisions suggest
that there is no general bar to Congress requesting that states waive sovereignty as a condition for receiving federal benefits.
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tional waiver scheme impermissible when attached to the
grant of patent rights.
1. Coercion and Discrimination
Some argue that conditional grants are harmful because
of the pressure exerted on the beneficiary.' A state may be
coerced to accept the condition placed on the federal benefit
because the state has too much to lose should it not accept the
conditioned benefit. 9 ' In such circumstances, the offer might
be characterized as something other than a "benefit."'96
Recognizing that some states may depend more upon
patents than others, a related concern is that conditional
grants could lead to discrimination. For example, a law that
denies patent rights to states that will not waive immunity,
but allows patents to private entities and states waiving immunity,
could be viewed as unconstitutionally discrimina197
tory.

Another aspect of conditional waivers is that they are applicable only to states, even though patents are granted to
both private and state entities. This raises the question of
whether States should be treated differently than private
citizens when both are seeking the same benefits. 98'
Moreover, conditional waivers on patents result in a double whammy from the state perspective - not only do States
stand to lose the benefit of patent ownership by not accepting
the condition, but they face uncertain liability should they accept the condition.
2. Germaneness
Some cases have focused on the legislative process that
194. See Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1428-58, for a more thorough treatment
of these concerns.
195. As a limitation expressed in Dole, coercion appears to be linked to the
magnitude of the state's potential loss should the state not comply with the condition. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
196. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 697 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that a distinction between a federal benefit and a sanction cannot be drawn because when a state's relative dependence on a benefit is substantial enough, the
state no longer has meaningful choice to accept or decline the offer).
197. See Berman et al., supra note 105, at 1149.
198. Although this particular concern was not voiced in the spending cases,
cited supra note 178, even though federal assistance under those schemes is obtainable by either private or state "programs or activities."
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generates the conditioned benefit, finding that as the national
interest for the condition becomes less germane to the national interest for granting the benefit, the more likely that
the condition should be invalidated.'99 This "germaneness"
limitation is expressed in the Dole test. °0
An analysis of the germaneness limitation is somewhat
hampered in the context of exchanging patent rights for a
waiver of state sovereignty, especially in an abstract discussion such as this, because it is not clear what level of judicial
scrutiny should be applied. There are at least three approaches under which the Supreme Court might view the
problem. Two of these approaches are found in Dole, while a
third approach is exemplified in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission. °1
The majority opinion in Dole found that the imposed condition of raising the State's minimum drinking age "directly
related to one of the main purposes for which the highway
funds are expended - safe interstate travel."0 2 The majority
approach appears to focus on the national objectives that are
sought in connection with the grant (e.g., safe highways), instead of a specific reason for the grant itself (money to build
highways), and asks if the condition can be "reasonably calculated" to support one or more of the more general objectives. On the other hand, Justice O'Connor's dissent criticized the majority approach as giving Congress too much
leeway to take advantage of its position as a source of federal
gratuity.0 3 Her approach would require conditions to be
linked to the specific uses of the grant.2 4
Justice O'Connor's approach to germaneness is influential because it appears to be more in-line with other decisions
by the Court. Although these decisions were made in contexts other than the congressional use of spending power,
199. See Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1420.
200. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
201. See id. at 208-09 (majority opinion); Id. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
202. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. See infra Part I.D.2.c for additional background on Dole.
203. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. See id. at 216. O'Connor stated that when "Congress appropriates
money to build a highway, it is entitled to insist that the highway be a safe one.
But it is not entitled to insist as a condition ...

that the State impose ...

lations in other areas of a State's social and economic life." Id.

regu-
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they delineate the difference between a permissible condition
on governmental power and an impermissible condition. For
example, an alternative approach to illustrate the power of
germaneness to determine when conditions become unconstitutional is found in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission."'
In Nollan, the Court "struck down a condition on a regulatory exemption as unconstitutional because not germane to
state interests that would have justified denying the exemption." ' The dispute arose when owners of a beachfront property sought a building permit from the California Coastal
Commission. ' The building permit was not denied altogether, even though it would have been a legitimate exercise
of the State's police power to deny the permit, in order to preserve what was left of the public's visual access to the sea.0 8
Instead, a condition placed on the permit was that the property owner had to allow the public an easement so people
could cross the property in order to walk along the beach.0 9
The reason for the easement was to allow easier public access
to beach areas.210 Indeed, the State could require such an
easement, but the Constitution mandates compensation be
made when doing so." ' The issue in Nollan was whether the
State could condition the grant of the permit on the uncompensated surrender of the easement. ' The court held the
condition invalid because of the "lack of nexus" between the
reason for the condition and the reason for the building restriction which had to do with visual access.1 3 The problem
in these circumstances was that the purpose of the condition,
even if serving a valid purpose, was accomplished without
payment of compensation."4 Nollan illustrates the concern
that conditions can become invalid when they are imposed to
circumvent constitutional restraints on what is normally accomplished directly - and that the germaneness test is an
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1463.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
See id. at 836.
See id. at 828.
See id.
See id. at 831.
See Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1463.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
See id.
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indicator of when a condition operates as circumvention.
In College Savings Bank, Justice Scalia wrote that "recognizing a congressional power to exact constructive [Pardentype] waivers of sovereign immunity through the exercise of
Article I powers would, also, as a practical matter, permit
Congress to circumvent the antiabrogation holding of Seminole Tribe."1 ' A conditional waiver offers a quid pro quo
which was absent in Parden-typewaiver, but nonetheless, the
germaneness requirement mandates that the reason for the
conditional waiver hew closely to the reason for which patents
are granted.216 Attempting to level the playing field between
state and private marketplace entities via conditional waivers
might be seen as means to achieve the objectives for having a
patent system, but that is not a reason for which Congress
grants patents."'
B. Reasons for PermittingConditional Waivers
The general principle behind conditional grants is that a
broad power to confer a benefit includes the lesser power to
withhold or condition that benefit.218 General arguments are
215. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 683 (1999).
216. Tenth Amendment concerns have also been voiced as a limit upon the
expansive use of conditions. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210
(1987). In regard to the congressional use of the spending power, Professor
Lynn A. Baker stated:
So long as Article I, which enumerates all the powers granted to Congress by the original Constitution is not interpreted to grant Congress
plenary power to regulate the states directly, the Tenth Amendment's
reservation to the states of all powers not delegated to the Federal
Government has content and significance. But if the Spending C]ause
is simultaneously interpreted to permit Congress to seek otherwise forbidden regulatory aims indirectly through a conditional offer of federal
funds to the states, the notion of 'a federal government of enumerated
powers' will have no meaning.
Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1920 (1995) (footnote omitted).
217. In College Savings Bank, the Court refused to carve out a niche in the
sovereign immunity doctrine to recognize a "market participant" exception. See
supra notes 119, 120 and accompanying text.
218. Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Dole opinion, is a proponent
of this principle. For example, in Posadas v. Tourism Co., the then-Justice
Rehnquist for the Court wrote, with regard to a state's ability to regulate gambling, that the "greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling .

. . ."

Posadas

v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986). For additional references where
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made below regarding the reasons why conditions amounting
to a waiver of sovereignty should be permitted.
First, there is ample support that Congress may condition its grants to states, 219 and that it is also perfectly constitutional for a state to waive its immunity and consent to private lawsuit."' To the extent Congress is clear that the
proffered benefit entails a conditional waiver, the State has
consented to suit by accepting the offer.22 ' The conditional
waiver is part of the bargained-for exchange.
Second, concerns over whether the conditions attached to
federal grants amount to something more coercive than putting States to a "hard choice," may be valid as a concern."2
But this is a reason to find a particular legislative scheme
impermissible, not to disallow conditional waivers altogether.2 Whether withholding a benefit amounts to something akin to a penalty or not, requires knowledge of the particular circumstances of the state that is unwilling to accept
the condition attached to the benefit. 224

Thus, conditional

waivers should be evaluated in the context in which they
arise, and not discarded from the outset.
Finally, conditional waivers are required so that ConChief Justice Rehnquist, as well as Justice Holmes have expounded upon this
idea, see Sullivan, supra note 192, at 1441-42, 1459-60.
219. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992) (explaining
that although Congress cannot directly compel state legislature or regulatory
action, it can induce behavior by putting conditions on grants); Dole, 483 U.S.
203; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
220. See Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
221. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L.
REV. 89, 104 (2000).
222. See id. at 102, 104.
223. See Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has never employed coercion to invalidate a funding
condition, and that federal courts are reluctant to use it).
Hard choice or not, at least with conditioning grants, as opposed to congressional legislative fiat, the ultimate decision rests with citizens. Where Congress
employs its Spending Power to attach conditions on the States' receipt of federal
funding, then
as by any other permissible method of encouraging a State to conform
to federal policy choices, the residents of the State retain the ultimate
decision as to whether or not the State will comply. If a State's citizens
view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may
elect to decline a federal grant.
New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
224. See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 697 (dissenting opinion).
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gress may be able to ensure accountability for the States' use
' If there are valid national objectives
of the benefit received. 25
for Congress to exercise its powers to approve compacts,
regulate interstate commerce, grant patents, and give out
funds, then it is reasonable that the States receiving benefits
from federal exercise conform their use of the benefits so as to
not undermine those national objectives. Professor Chemerinsky argues that "[11awsuits against a state are an obvious,
essential way of accomplishing [accountability]. Preventing
suits against States would allow them to take federal money
and disregard the conditions that Congress constitutionally
has the right to impose."226 As much could be said in other
contexts where Congress has legitimate national objectives,
such as granting an interstate compact or offering patents.
C. Applicability of the Dole Test to Conditional Waivers ina
PatentContext
The Dole test limitations were presented in the context of
a condition attached to an exercise of the spending power.
Even so, the same limitations should apply to conditions attached to grants of patent rights, and even when the condition amounts to a waiver of sovereign immunity. It is not surprising that the Dole test was enunciated in the context of a
conditional spending power exercise given the "vast resources" of the Federal Government and the states' increasing
227 The readependence on a federal source for state revenue.
son that the Dole test should be considered is that the general
problems with conditional waivers all inhere in the Dole test.
For example, as discussed in Part II.D.2, lower court decisions that found conditional waivers valid only barely
touched upon the Dole test, if considering Dole at all. A major
focus in these cases was whether the State had "knowingly
and voluntarily" waived immunity2 28 or whether the condition

225. See Chemerinsky, supra note 221, at 104.
226. Id.
227. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Professor Baker argues that, for this reason, the Tenth Amendment
should be narrowly interpreted to restrict the spending power, as Tenth
Amendment concerns have more recently been applied to limit congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce. See Baker, supranote 216, at 1920.
228. This was a concern in the telephone cases, cited supra note 154.
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However,

these considerations are inculcated into the voluntariness
2
limitation expressed in the Dole test..
"
The point being that
each limitation in the Dole test may only become an issue under circumstances where it is a close question whether that
limitation would work to invalidate a particular use of a conditional waiver.23 ' Ensuring that the limitations of the Dole

test are met should work to ensure validity of a conditional
waiver even in the context of the patent power.
D. Meeting the Dole test When Attaching Conditional
Waivers to Patents
1. "GeneralWelfare" Restriction
This restriction resides in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1,
and exists textually as a limit on how the Federal Government may tax and spend.232 Since Congress has a direct grant
of power to issue patents, 33 and in light of the expansive interpretation given to the Necessary and Proper Clause concluding Section 8 of Article 1,24 this limitation of the Dole test
is not particularly pertinent.
2. Voluntariness
There are two essential components to determine
whether states "exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of
the consequences." 3

First, the conditional waiver must be

unambiguous in order to put the states on notice.236 Second,
229. See the spending cases, cited supra notes 178, 181.
230. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. See also infra notes 235-50 and accompanying text.
231. A similar argument is made by Berman et al., supra note 105, at 1141.
With reference to the IDEA cases, discussed supra note 181, Berman et al. describe the Dole test as "collapsing" into the particular focus of the Atascadero
rule. However, unlike Berman et al.'s characterization of the Dole test as a precondition for Atascadero's application, I believe that the clear-statement rule of
Atascadero articulates one of the inherent limitations of the Dole test. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
232. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
233. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
234. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
235. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
20r6. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243, 247 (1985)
(explaining that Congress must unequivocally express its intent to condition
participation on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity).
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there must be a mechanism to determine that the state, or
23 7 As Colstate entity, has manifested its consent to be sued.
lege Savings Bank made clear, both components must be present for a valid waiver.238
It follows that if a conditional waiver attached to issued
patents is to meet the voluntariness limitation, the waiver
must cover only the state entity that evidences its intent to
consent. To explain: assume that Congress requires a state to
enact a statute waiving immunity to patent infringement
2 9
suits before one of its state entities may receive a patent.
Passage of such a statute by the state clearly manifests the
state's acceptance of the condition. But if Congress does not
require the statute and merely states that acceptance of a
patent works to effect a waiver of immunity, then even if the
state entity may have waived its sovereign immunity by accepting a patent, this is hardly adequate to manifest the consent of other state entities or that of the state as a whole.
This understanding of the voluntariness limitation is met
in lower court decisions that found valid conditional waivers.
For example, in the telephone cases it was noted that the
Telecommunications Act "does not mandate that a state
commission participate in the arbitration process. If a state
chooses not to participate in the Act, the Federal Communications Commission assumes the role of the state commission.
However, if a state does choose to participate, the Act expressly provides that any aggrieved party to a state commission's determination may bring suit."" ° Congress was "under
no obligation to allow states to participate in the Act's regulatory scheme."241 Congress met the voluntariness requirement
by putting the conditional waiver in unambiguous statutory
language, 42 and the state manifested its consent when it
237. See id. at 234 n.1; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974); Great
N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
238. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1999). See quote from College Savings Bank supra in
text accompanying note 118.
239. For the purpose of this hypothetical, it is also assumed that the other
Dole test limitations are met.
240. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 134 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497-98
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted).
241. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 938 (10th
Cir. 2000).
242. See id. at 939 (quoting section 252(e)(4) of the Telecommunications Act
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formed a commission and began arbitrating disputes. 4 3
Similarly, the conditional waiver attached to the receipt of Title IX funding, and met the voluntariness requirement by
limiting the scope of the waiver to those "programs or activities" that actually receive the funds.244
The conditional waiver attached to receipt of federal assistance under the IDEA is more problematic than the Title
IX funding cases in the sense that the text of the IDEA does
not explicitly limit liability to those state entities actually receiving funds.245 On the other hand, the scope of liability under the IDEA conditioned waiver can only be invoked when a
state does not use the money in compliance with the federal
goals and procedures associated in educating handicapped
children. 246 Thus Judge Easterbrook found that suit under
the IDEA "is of course limited to enforcing the federal terms
and conditions."2 47 As explained below the conditional waiver
in IDEA is on firmer ground
with respect to germaneness
2 48
than the waiver in Title IX.
which states that "[n]o State court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of
a State commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under this section").
243. See id.
244. See Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 551, 553 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000). While Title IX falls within the ambit
of the general congressional notice of conditional waiver in section 1003 of the
Rehabilitation Act, the language of Title IX itself limits the waiver to those education programs or activities receiving the federal financial assistance. See 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a); Litman, 186 F.3d at 551; see also Jim C. v. United States, 235
F.3d 1079, 1080 n.3 (8th Cir 2000) (stating that in relation to acceptance of
funds under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the waiver only attaches to
the program or activity receiving the funds leaving "unaffected both other state
agencies and the State as a whole").
245. See Berman et al., supra note 105, at 1142.
246. See id.
247. See Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000).
248. See infra Part IV.D.3.
Berman et al. distinguish three ways Congress might use the spending
power to induce state immunity waivers, termed respectively, a usage limitation, a usage side-constraint, and an entity side-constraint. See Berman et al.,
supra note 105, at 1139-40. A usage limitation is where Congress imposes limits on what or how distributed funds are actually used by the recipient. See id.
A usage side-constraint imposes "side-constraints on the administration of the
funded activity. Grants to fund an afterschool program, for example, might be
disbursed on the condition that the afterschool program not [engage in forms of
discrimination]." Id. at 1140. Most broad of the three, an entity side-constraint
limits the activities of a funded entity unconnected with the particular administration of the funded activity. See id. Thus, the IDEA conditional waiver is
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If the understanding of the voluntariness limitation expressed above is correct then the federal district court was off
the mark in McGuire v Regents of the University of Michigan,
which held that the University of Michigan waived its immunity to private lawsuit, pursuant to the TRCA, by owning
trademarks.2 49 The TRCA, ruled as an impermissible attempt
to abrogate state sovereign immunity in College Savings
Bank, can hardly be said to contain an unambiguous conditional waiver inasmuch as nobody noticed it in College Savings Bank.25 °
3. Germaneness
As explained above, the court's approach to germaneness
is varied.2 5' Given this unpredictability, a conditional waiver
cannot be faulted for meeting the most circumspect reading of
the germaneness requirement. This would limit the scope of
conditional waivers to only holding states accountable for how
they use their own patents.25 2 This is not satisfying to private
patent holders because they want to sue a state for the states'
infringement of privately-owned patents, even if the state's
activity is otherwise lawful.
One solution is to follow the precedent of the cases finding a lawful conditional waiver under Title IX and section 504
characterized as a usage side-constraint, whereas the Title IX conditional
waiver is more akin to an entity side-constraint. See id. at 1141.
These modes of using the spending power described by Berman et al. are
characterizations made as part of the germaneness inquiry. Clearly, a usage
limitation will meet a strict application of germaneness, whereas an entity sideconstraint necessitates the acceptance of a broader standard of germaneness.
Given the variety of circumstances under which Congress might use a conditional waiver, having a flexible interpretation of germaneness is convenientwith the caveat that as a less strict standard of germaneness is applied, a concomitant increased scrutiny should be applied in the areas of voluntariness and
coercion.
249. See McGuire v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 2000 WL 1459435, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2000).
250. In rejecting the Parden-type waiver under the TRCA, College Savings
Bank noticed that the "statutory provision relied upon to demonstrate that
Florida constructively waived its sovereign immunity is the very same provision
that purported to abrogate it." Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 684 (1999). The same would be true with
respect to a conditional waiver.
251. See supra Part IV.A.2.
252. This is Justice O'Connor's approach in Dole. See South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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of the Rehabilitation Act.253 Under these schemes, the condition is that the state "program or activity" receiving the funds
cannot discriminate on the basis of sex or disability, which
hardly is germane to the reason for which the money is given
out. Presumably, anchoring the waiver scheme well within
the requirements of the voluntariness limitation by limiting
the scope of the waiver to only those programs and activities
receiving the money, affords a more relaxed standard under
the germaneness requirement, which is why these conditional
waivers remain valid. In comparison, the IDEA cases indicate a tighter nexus between the reason the money was given
out, and the basis for which the state could be sued,254 which
should afford greater leniency when considering the voluntariness requirement. Thus, for conditional waivers on patents, one option might be to clearly restrict the scope of an
immunity waiver to those state agencies actually owning patents, and hope for more lenient standard of germaneness
from the courts.
Another problem implicit in germaneness is that a conditional waiver on patents must not be viewed as circumvention
around existing constitutional restraints on Congress's ability
to abrogate sovereign immunity.255 After all, individuals are
already, at least in theory, protected against states' patent infringement via the Fourteenth Amendment. However, it
seems apparent that conditional waivers under the Dole test
need not meet every requirement perfectly. This is implicit in
the majority's approach to germaneness in Dole, where the
majority seemed willing to accept a more forgiving standard
of germaneness as long as there was little or no coercion involved.256
The reasons the PRCA failed to abrogate state sovereignty could potentially befall a conditional waiver of indis253. See cases cited supra note 178.
254. The IDEA "provides federal money to assist state and local agencies in
educating handicapped children, and conditions such finding upon a State's
compliance with extensive goals and procedures." Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 179 (1982). It also confers a right of action upon a party alleging a
violation of procedural and substantive rights that the Act guarantees, and explicitly provides that "a State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of this chapter." Berman et al., supra note 105, at 1140.
255. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
256. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 n.3.

2002]

CONDITIONAL WAIVERS

criminate scope: the PRCA subjected states to "expansive liability," but "Congress did nothing to limit the coverage of the
[PRCA] to cases involving arguable constitutional violations,
such as where a State refuses to offer any state-court remedy
for patent owners whose patents it had infringed." 57 Thus, a
conditional waiver covering patent infringement should escape the reproof of circumventing existing constitutional provisions as long as the waiver is limited in its application. For
example, the waiver might only attach where states do not
enunciate their own remedies for infringement or, alternatively, the waiver might merely admit federal jurisdiction to
lawsuits which solely seek to enjoin the states from engaging
in patent infringement. Surely, asking a state to respect the
patent rights of private entities that are protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment is not too much to ask in return for
receiving patent benefits.
4. No Other ConstitutionalProvisionscan Bar the
Condition
This limitation presents little problem, as there is nothing unconstitutional
about a state voluntarily waiving its
25 8
sovereignty.
5. Coercion
Coercion was absent in Dole since states that refused to
raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one stood to lose
only five percent of their otherwise allotted highway funds.259
But what if it had been twenty-five, fifty-one, or one hundred
percent? The Court refused to address the issue.
State programs that do not consent to suits alleging discrimination stand to lose one hundred percent of their federal
financial assistance under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, but apparently this is not coercive. Jim C. v. United
States noted that the Arkansas Department of Education
could avoid the waiver requirements of section 504 "simply by

257. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 646-47 (1999).
258. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999).
259. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
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declining federal education funds. 2" The sacrifice of all federal education funds, approximately $250 million or 12 per
cent of the annual state education budget [for the year 19992001] ... would be politically painful, but we cannot say that
it compels Arkansas's choice. '261 So if Arkansas were to begin
slashing its education budget, does the waiver condition in
section 504 become increasingly coercive as the federal money
represents a bigger piece of the overall budget?
How does one apply this view of coercion in the patent
context? What seems unworkable is to try to find some percentage of patents to be withheld in case a state will not consent to a waiver. A conditional waiver only applicable to state
entities that refuse to consent (the idea being that a state entity can only accumulate a certain percentage of a state's total
patents) is also an ill-fitting solution. This is because one
cannot expect state entities, by definition, to exist as distinct,
independent entities apart from the state as a whole.262
This suggests that it would be a mistake to construct a
conditional waiver scheme that threatens to withhold patents
from states refusing to voluntarily waive sovereign immunity.
On the other hand, it is also apparent that when a narrow
reading of germaneness is adopted, the concern over coercion
is lessened. For example, in MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. Public Service commission, coercion was not an issue.26
Congress was under no obligation to allow states to participate in the regulation of the telecommunications services. 64
But in granting that opportunity to the States, Congress
properly reserved a conditional waiver, limited in scope, that
applied only when it became apparent that a state commission was incapable of effectively using its federal grant. 65
Certainly patent grants are different than grants of regula260. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2591 (2001).
261. Id.

262. Sovereign immunity may be asserted on behalf of a state by any state
entity that is in essence an arm of the state as a matter of federal law. See, e.g.,

Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 566 (9th Cir. 2001); Pendergrass
v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 144 F.3d 342, 344 (5th Cir. 1998);

Mancuso v. New York State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1996).
263. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 216 F.3d 929, 939 n.6
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167 (2001).
264. See id. at 938.
265. See id.
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tory power, particularly due to the fact that patents go to both
private and public entities. Just the same, no state is likely
to find a sympathetic ear when a conditional waiver scheme
on patents has a limited scope of liability, and calls for the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in the few circumstances where
a state has demonstrated that it is likely to misuse its patents, or provide no remedies for violating the patent rights of
others.
V. PROPOSAL
The following three part proposal presents a strategy for
implementing a conditional waiver scheme attached to the
grant of federal patents that meets the various limitations
discussed in the previous section. Only the first part, part A,
contains a mandatory, albeit for limited purposes, conditional
waiver. Parts B and C work to instill predictability into the
national patent system by requiring that a state receiving
patents express exactly how other patentholders' rights are to
be protected when infringed upon. In part B, states are encouraged to waive their sovereignty to private lawsuit. Part
C is a default provision that comes into effect only when
states are recalcitrant to choose one of the conditional waiver
options in part B.
A.

Imposing FederalJurisdictionOver Claims of Patent
Misuse and DeclaratoryRelief Against State
Patentholders

Under the most circumspect reading of the germaneness
limitation, the Federal Government may place conditions
upon how states actually use a federal patent.2 66 Through explicit statutory text, Congress can put states on notice that
receipt of a patent entails a waiver of sovereign immunity
limited to the states' actual use of the patent. A mandate
that the states refrain from engaging in conduct that
amounts to patent misuse under federal law,267 can be used to
266. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
267. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665
(1944) (stating that a patent is the "grant of a special privilege" which can be
nullified by, for example, tying the purchase of non-patented goods to sales of
the patented product).
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limit the ways that states use their patent to be in-line with
the objectives of a national patent system.26 Similarly, where
a state capitalizes on the uncertainty of validity of its patent
by threatening but never consummating infringement litigation, a state can be subjected to a declaratory judgement action.269
The concerns underlying coerciveness require that the
result of an adverse decision against a state in patent misuse
and declaratory judgement suits only work to render the patent either unenforceable or invalid. The most a state should
be subject to "losing" under the conditional waiver is the
benefit itself.
B.

Declarationby States of the Manner by Which Private
PatentholdersMay Seek Redress for PatentInfringement

Recognizing that giving predictability to how patent
rights are to be maintained strengthens the federal patent
system for the benefit of all patentholders, this part seeks to
encourage states that receive federal patents to declare what
remedies are available for state conduct amounting to patent
infringement. States are encouraged to participate in this
part, but patent grants will not be denied to a state refusing
to make such a declaration under this part. Participation under this part requires action by a state body having authority
to waive sovereign immunity, in order to ensure that a state
can be held to its declaration.
A state body having appropriate authority shall enact a
waiver of sovereign immunity consistent with one of the three
options discussed below.
1. General Waiver to FederalJurisdiction
This option requires that states waive immunity to federal jurisdiction over a patent infringement action brought by
a private party against any state entity engaging in conduct
alleged to give rise to the action. States might be able to elect
268. See Berman et al., supra note 105, at 1151-52.
269. See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d
1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999). New Star Lasers held that under the current law a
state can be subject to a declaratory judgment action. See id. This decision is
problematic because the current patent law has no explicit provisions regarding
a conditional waiver on the receipt of a patent as required under the voluntariness limitation.
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to limit the recoverable damages under this option. For example, rather than subjecting the state to the panoply of
damages available to private patent infringers, damages
could be limited to those which the Federal Government allows when it receives an adverse judgement of patent infringement.27 ° Another possibility is to allow injunctive relief
to the private party to by enabling it to enjoin the state entity
from further infringement.
2. FederalJurisdictionLimited to State Entities that
Have Received Patents
This option requires that states consent to suit in federal
court, but only for allegedly infringing activity by state entities that have actually received a federal patent. As in option
1, remedies upon an adverse judgement may be made limited
in scope.
3. Remedies Solely through State Courts or Agencies
This option requires that states explicitly pronounce the
causes of action that the courts will recognize for conduct that
otherwise constitutes patent infringement by a state entity.
Another possibility may be to allow states to create an agency
to hear grievances. Some federal guidelines will have to be
devised as to what might or might not be acceptable.
Creationof a FederalPatent Oversight Committee for
States Unwilling to Make a Declarationunder PartB
This part of the proposal is the "stick" that takes effect
only if and when states take the benefits of patent grants
without making a declaration under part B (non-electing
states). It calls for the creation of a federal commission to
achieve two purposes. The first purpose is to determine what,
if any, remedies non-electing states make available to private
patentees for state patent infringement, and make these determinations available to all inquiring parties interested in
pursuing an action for infringement against a state entity
from a non-electing state. The second purpose is to create a

C.

270. Under certain circumstances private parties are subject to treble damages or attorneys fees. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 284, 285 (2001). In comparision, treble
damages and attorneys fees cannot be recovered from the Federal Government.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994).
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record of how aggrieved private parties fare under the nonelecting state's system of compensating for its patent infringement, and make such records available to Congress. In
this way, Congress will have evidence of any pattern of patent
infringement by non-electing states. If such patterns emerge,
Congress will have some basis for abrogating state sovereignty outright.27 ' The cost for the creation and operation of
the federal commission will be shared among all the entities
participating in the federal patent scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION

The answer to the question posed in the title of this
comment is a qualified "yes." Where the constitutional right
of sovereign immunity is at stake in exchange for patent
grants, the concerns over coercion are likely to invalidate a
conditional waiver in patent law unless the waiver scheme
meets a strict definition of germaneness. This may not be
true for conditional waivers attached to other federal gifts or
gratuities. The conferral of patents is different than, say,
federal consent to a compact, or ceding regulatory control over
a preempted field of interstate commerce, because patents are
offered to both private and state entities. To use a grant of a
patent alone as a basis to change the relationship between
private citizens and states, that is, to "level the playing field,"
raises too many hurdles which fall under the guise of coerciveness.
The proposed regulatory scheme offers a compromise. It
puts states on notice that where patents are received, states
must accede to private lawsuits where their use of the patent
exceeds the purpose of the federal grant.
Part II.C reviewed mechanisms by which private patentholders might be remedied for a state's patent infringement.
These are largely untested, however, bringing uncertainty
into the value of having a patent, which is adverse to national
objectives. But requiring a state to forego its constitutional
right of sovereign immunity for conduct unrelated to the ways
by which it uses a federal benefit cannot work, even if that
271. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-46 (1999). Part of the problem with the abrogation attempt under the PRCA was that Congress had not shown a pattern of state deprivations. Id.
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2 Putting aside the
conduct amounts to patent infringement.
fact that the Supreme Court is unlikely to entertain a federally imposed tit-for-tat exchange of constitutional rights of
sovereign immunity for patent infringement, the fact is that
unless the state confers no remedy, infringement is not a constitutional violation.273 Thus, the proposed regulatory scheme
encourages states to explicitly declare the remedies that exist,
aiming towards predictability in patent law at a cost that is
unlikely to convert the patent benefit into a penalty.

272. See discussion supra Part IV.
273. See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 645.

